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This article discusses the rise and increasing use of unmanned military 
systems. It describes how over the course of the last fifteen years they 
have increasingly become weapons of importance in modern-day con-
flicts. These new weapons have altered the nature of conflict, its shape, 
focus, and its political notion. Yet the largest risk comes not from the 
current changes, but from those in the near future. These foreseen 
changes could give rise to a scenario in which the notion and conduct of 
conflict could be further transformed, leading to an entire new concept 
of conflict. This is going to be an unmanned, non-human notion of con-
flict, in which the political cost of conflict will be radically different. This 
new notion, and its limited political costs, could subsequently create a 
perpetual state of conflict.
Over the course of the last two decades the world has rapidly become 
acquainted with digital and robotic systems.1 When these systems first 
became visible to the larger public, they were often viewed as novel, sci-fi 
systems: Systems from the future, looking as if they came straight from 
a Star Wars film. Now two decades later Star Wars films are still full of 
innovations, Harrison Ford is still around, most recently starring in its 
VII episode, but the initial novelty and amazement that surrounded the 
introduction of digital and robotic systems has somewhat disappeared. 
Indeed, a quick look at the current state of technology illustrates just how 
1 Peter W. Singer, “The Proliferation of Drones. Changes in size, intelligence reframe ques-
tions of use” (Report, Washington: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, September 2013).
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fast these futuristic digital and robotic systems have become part of every-
day life. Unmanned aerial vehicles, more popularly known as drones, are 
the most visible element of this technological revolution, and the cor-
nerstone of a contemporary revolution in military affairs (RMA). They 
have become a common sight in recent years, with scores of hobbyists 
flying them to make beautiful images and videos with attached GoPros, 
occasionally causing a delay in flight services when a drone flies too close 
to commercially manned aviation. They have become so established (and 
desired) that they now top the annual Christmas wish lists of kids (and 
adults).2
At the same time robotic unmanned cars, as currently being devel-
oped by all major car companies, such as BMW and Nissan, and likewise 
under development by, or in cooperation with technology giants such as 
Google and Apple, seem to be on the brink of arriving at our roads, wait-
ing to drive us home and to work, all without any direct human involve-
ment, leaving the human with not more than the role of passive driver 
at best, hopefully leaving the era of drunk driving soon behind.3 At the 
same time a wide array of digital technologies has been eagerly embraced 
and accepted by society in the recent decades. We cannot imagine our 
lives anymore without our smartphones, tablets, laptops, and smart-
watches that do so much more than simply showing the time and giving 
an hourly bleep. Recent innovations in digital technology even seem on 
the brink of crossing the boundaries between our body and the physi-
cal: a new generation of chips, with built in internet connection capa-
bilities, are now present on the market that can be directly inserted into 
the human body. These digital developments and subsequent digital love 
affairs by large majorities of our societies have been topics of avid dis-
cussion, among academics, politicians, technologists, and even at fam-
ily birthday parties – albeit probably to a lesser extent. Likewise, plenty 
has been written on how our generation(s) have become addicted to 
digital technology and indeed to the generations born in the 1990s and 
2 Alex Renton, “Christmas Gift: Attack of the drones,” The Guardian, 23 November 2014.
3 Todd A. Litman, “Autonomous Vehicle Implementation Predictions Implications for Trans-
port Planning” (Report, Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2015).
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later, digital (and robotic) technology seems as much a common good as 
bread and rice.4
As such it seems that increasingly non-human systems are taking up a 
larger and more visible role in human societies and that humanity seems 
to have become accustomed to and comfortable with these technologies. 
We are still far from Stanisław Ulam’s concept of singularity, and Ray 
Kurzweil’s and Vernor Vinge’s predictions about reaching this stage, in 
2030 and 2045 respectively, for the moment still seem more fantasy – or 
horror for the matter – than fact, but we can without doubt state that our 
societies have become highly digitalized, and that machines – digital and 
robotic – have taken up larger roles in our world.5 In order for modern 
day societies to function well, it is by now largely dependent on not only 
well functioning humans – that is order, security, and health – but like-
wise the well-functioning of digital and robotic systems.
Despite this growing dependence and wholehearted embracement of 
these technologies, societies are only now gradually starting to compre-
hend the broader implications of these digital and robotic revolutions, 
and how it will impact the future development of our societies.6 The 
debate for example about the coming age of robotisation on the work 
floor, and the subsequent demise, and possibly even disappearance of 
the blue-collar worker, for example has only recently emerged. Despite 
this, the robotic takeover of the work floor has been an ongoing process 
for well over a decade, and the concept of blue collar workers, one next 
to each other on the assembly line, is still increasingly common in low 
income countries, where the costs are low enough to still sustain human 
assembly lines. Assembly lines, in nations where the hourly wage of a blue 
worker have been substantially higher, such as in Germany, have been a 
4 Manuel Castells, “The Impact of the Internet on Society: A global perspective,” MIT Tech-
nology Review (September 2014).
5 Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near (New York: Penguin Group, 2005); Stanislaw Ulam, 
“Tribute to John von Neumann,” Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 64:3 (1958); 
Vernor Vinge, “The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human 
Era” (Vision-21 Symposium, March 1993).
6 Castells, “The Impact of the Internet on Society”; “Digital Media and Society Implications 
in a Hyperconnected Era” (Report, World Economic Forum, January 2016).
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mixture of workers and robots, working hand-in (robotic) hand already 
for some time.
Likewise, a similar tendency seems to develop regarding the intro-
duction of robotic systems into social settings: in Japan, for example, 
the introduction of Pepper – a robot capable of sophisticated emotional 
(vocal) interaction and able to read a human’s emotional state – has been 
largely one of wonder and amazement, without much of a debate emerg-
ing about what happens when robotic machines start to substitute human 
friends. The introduction of driverless cars seems to suffer from a similar 
fate: the ethical considerations about what a car, and their robotic drivers, 
should do in case it would see a deadly crash incoming, has been largely 
conducted on the sidelines, and has only barely influenced the rapid 
introduction of such cars. A few years ago, driverless cars were science 
fiction for the larger public, possibly a year ago a novelty, whereas by now 
they are already commercially operating in various United States’ cities, 
seemingly accepted into civil life. Yet few ethical and moral discussions 
ensued on how exactly such cars should act when a collision is imminent. 
Should the driverless car decide to hit the other car, hoping for the best 
survival chances of its passengers, or should it sacrifice itself, as his car 
has only one passenger, whereas the opposing car is “driven” by the next-
door-soccer-mum, with three kids on board?
In general, there seems to be a broader tendency that the techno-
logical speed of development, and the introduction of new systems into 
society, outpaces any possible debate about the utility and ethical and 
juridical implications that could change or newly develop as a result of 
the introduction of such systems. This has also been the case with digi-
tal innovations: Concepts such as the Internet of Things (Iot) and web 
2.0,7 have been largely embraced, without society willing to understand 
7 The Oxford Dictionary defines the Internet of Things as “The interconnection via the Inter-
net of computing devices embedded in everyday objects, enabling them to send and receive 
data.” With everyday objects here in the broadest sense. From your fridge, to your TV, your car, 
possibly your pacemaker, your watch to your hairbrush. All connected via the Internet into a 
giant (personal) network. Web 2.0 is not a new technology, but is rather simply a new way in 
which the Internet, and its webpages react with its users: from a static webpage (Internet 1.0) to 
more dynamic, interactive webpages. Famous examples are Facebook and YouTube.
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the implications. Society at times does wonder about the possibility of 
what could occur if this mass of (big) data would be breached, hacked, 
altered, or misused, but the idea (and pleasure) of having your refrigera-
tor always full with fresh food, the light on when one returns home, and 
the house comfortably warm – as enabled by IoT technology – seems to 
prevail within our societies. In this, mankind has ironically progressed 
little since mankind left its caves: The comfort of having (enough) food, 
light, and heat are still considered, to some degree at least, more impor-
tant than critical thought. While these priorities might have altered only a 
little throughout the centuries, the world in which we live in has changed 
dramatically in the last decades. Human and non-human interaction was 
something found in sci-fi books during the last century, by now one can 
buy a robotic companion and friend for life. This whole technological 
development, at such rash speeds, seems to leave civilian societies in the 
middle of Terra incognita, wondering how a future of human and non-
human interaction will look like, and which direction and road, we as 
societies, will take in this unknown world.
This unfamiliar terrain of (future) human and non-human inter-
action, and their respective roles is also the case in the military world, 
where the introduction and advancement of digital and robotic technol-
ogy occurred earlier and has progressed further than in the civil world.8 
Much like in the civil world here too significant changes took place. 
Indeed, a look at recent conflicts illustrate how over the course of the last 
fifteen years, digital and robotic systems have taken up a role of impor-
tance in military conflict and affairs. The so-called drone wars – the US 
airstrike campaign, with Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) 
against terrorists, led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – are 
probably the best known and most visible example of this.9 This campaign 
started well over a decade ago in 2002, has invoked much discussion, and 
has become the most prominent weapon of choice for American presi-
8 Singer, “The Proliferation of Drones,” – P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and 
Cyberwar: What everyone needs to know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2–4.
9 Steve Coll, “The Unblinking Stare,” The New Yorker Magazine, 24 November 2015; C. Chris-
tine Fair, “Drone Wars,” Foreign Policy, 28 May 2010; Pir Zubair Shah, “My Drone War,” Foreign 
Policy, 27 February 2012.
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dents in their counter terrorism efforts. And it seems it will remain so 
in the near future: Donald Trump, the new president (and by the way 
also Hillary Clinton, his opponent in the elections), has firmly declared 
his support for drone strikes, something which is reflected in the high 
number of strikes his administration authorized in the first forty five days 
of his presidency, which at its current pace is a ratio of three times more 
intensive than under President Barack Obama.10 Further indications of 
the growing importance of robotic systems is that the club of drone strik-
ing nations, which for a long time solely consisted of the US, the UK, 
and Israel, has seen a recent enlargement with a number of nations, with 
much more limited military capabilities and budgets, joining the group: 
Pakistan – in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Iraq – 
against ISIS targets in Northern Iraq, Nigeria – against Boko Haram ter-
rorists, and Myanmar – against insurgents in the border area with China, 
have in the last two years all conducted drone strikes.11 In addition, non-
state armed groups, such as Hezbollah, ISIS and other actors in the Syrian 
civil wars are widely using robotic systems, for intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance, and even limited bombing purposes.12 In this, the long 
held western dominance on robotic military technologies seems to be 
slowly disappearing, with now military robotic systems available to an 
ever increasing numbers of actors, for a wide range of purposes and pos-
sibilities, contributing to a changing face of conflict.13
Yet while these technologies, and drone wars, are now becoming a 
global military affair and are changing the nature of conflict, militaries, 
politicians, and governments do not (yet) understand the full implica-
10 Micah Zenko, “The not so peaceful transition of power: Trump’s drone strike outpace 
Obama,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2 March 2017.
11 Tobias J. Burgers, “An Unmanned South-China-Sea? Understanding the risks and implica-
tions of the arrival of the digital and robotic revolution in military affairs in the South-China-
Sea,” – Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters: Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, ed. 
E. Fels and Truong-Minh Vu (Cham: Springer, 2016), 77–94; Scott N. Romaniuk and Tobias 
J. Burgers, “China Could Dominate the Global Armed Drone Market,” China Policy Institute 
Analysis, University of Nottingham (20 February 2017).
12 Scott N. Romaniuk and Tobias J. Burgers, “Entering the Era of Unmanned Terrorism,” 
Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 15:1 (2017): 5–7.
13 World of Drones, New America Foundation website.
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tions these technologies will have upon the future notion of conflict. 
Indeed, much of the introduction of military robotic systems has been a 
process in which not much thought has been given about future political 
implications and which can be better summarized under the motto “we 
will see where it goes”.14
As one US colonel adequately pointed out, “we are building the bridge 
to the future while standing on it”.15 Such limited considerations about 
our future, and the future of conflict, and how it will be influenced by the 
rise of robotics, raises numerous questions that should be answered. At 
the centre of this discussion should be the question of what a future vision 
of conflict will be like? It is without doubt a good thing that the military 
is building a bridge to future: It at least provides a basis on which a future 
can be built, nevertheless the direction of this bridge and what happens 
once militaries exit the bridge is poorly understood. In this regard, we 
could nearly go as far as to state that the military establishment, and the 
political establishment for that matter too, seems to be partially blind to 
the (political) implications of technological revolutions of its own mak-
ing. Ironically so, as robotic systems are often hailed within military 
establishments as increasing situational awareness, thereby decreasing 
the infamous Clausewitzian ‘fog of war’, a new fog of war seems to be 
rising. That fog could muddle the categories of conflict and of war alto-
gether, with unforeseen and possibly tragic consequences.
A future notion of war, in which humans have an increasingly lim-
ited role, raises fundamental questions about the future political nature 
of war. Throughout the history of warfare, the human factor and cost have 
been important, if not decisive factors, in questions on the political neces-
sity, utility and benefit of starting, continuing, and ending wars. However, 
future unmanned, nonhuman wars would only to a limited degree face 
questions about their political, social and economic cost from the larger 
public, exactly due the direct absence and role of humans in waging war. 
This raises the question what will happen with the notion and conduct of 
14 David Kilcullen and Andrew M. Exum, “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,” New 
York Times, 17 May 2009.
15 Quoted in Peter W. Singer, Wired for War (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 16.
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war, if it becomes such a “low cost” affair? Could we in the future possibly 
conduct wars on the “political cheap”? And if wars become so easy to 
conduct – due to their limited economic, political and social costs – will 
the world find it easier to start more wars, to continue them, and possibly 
to never end them? Could we be moving into a continuous state of war? 
Wars far away from the public’s interest, experience, and vision?
Theoretically speaking, such a state of affairs and endless wars could 
lead to a reversion of Kant’s peace theory, which has been the basis of 
peace and conflict studies, and has influenced generations of policy mak-
ers, politicians, military leaders, and citizens. Should we imagine a future, 
in which the world is embroiled in a perpetual state of war, made pos-
sibly by digital and robotic machines? In which universities will solely 
have departments and research institutes for conflict and war studies, 
rather than peace and conflict resolution, as peace, and the concept 
of it could have by then become something of the past, gathering aca-
demic dust. An ancient, romantic concept, cherished by historians, but 
not of importance to those who will study contemporary political and 
military affairs.
This paper seeks to understand these future visions, answer the ques-
tions posed above, and aims to predict to which extent future visions of 
war will be digital and robotic, and what this will mean for the political 
notion of conflict and war. It seeks to analyse this by answering two main 
questions. First, how likely is the above described scenario of digital and 
robotic conflict? Secondly, what would be the political implications of 
such a state of conflict?
Current visions of war: the emerging  
non-human in war
As the famed physicist and Nobel laureate Niels Bohr said “Prediction is 
very difficult, especially if it’s about the future”. Now, Bohr was without 
doubt right, and predicting and understanding the future is a difficult, 
and in the case of military affairs, indeed often a thankless task. Further-
more, questions like how far can you look, and how accurate will it be, 
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are always of importance. History is littered with beautiful cases of futur-
ists who predicted the most fantastic, or horrendous futures, only to be 
proven wrong by time. As Conrad Crane, the former director of the U.S. 
Army Military History Institute, rightfully noted that when it comes to 
understanding future visons of conflict and predicting how war might 
develop in the years beyond the horizon the effective range is up to 20 
years. Any predictions after this timeframe would be difficult and would 
run the risk that future visions might be filled with mistakes, or even hor-
ribly off.16 Crane quotes from T. X. Hammes, a Distinguished Research 
Fellow at the U.S. National Defense University, who makes the point quite 
beautifully: “There is a fine line between a vision and a hallucination.”17 
Fortunately, predicting and understanding a future vision of robotic con-
flict does not need to be as difficult as Bohr made it sound – and hope-
fully not as thankless – and with a bit of luck hallucinations should not 
occur. This is foremost the result because when it comes to predicting a 
robotic, partly non-human future of conflict, the first contours of such 
future robotic conflict are already visible. The prior mentioned US drone 
strike campaign is the prime example of how the future is already here, 
but the use of robotics in conflict has a long history.
It is history which gives us the first indications of how future robotic 
conflict just might look. In this, the famed strategist and philosopher 
Machiavelli was right when he said that “Whoever wishes to foresee the 
future must consult the past.”18 The roots of the digital and robotic revo-
lution in military affairs (DRRMA) can be traced back to the late 1970s. 
It was Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR, 
who was seeking new ways to close the ever increasing capabilities gap 
between Warsaw pact forces and NATO. He sought to initiate a military-
technical revolution that would allow the USSR to (re)gain the upper 
16 Conrad Crane, “Note to Futurists: The maximum effective range of a prediction is 20 years,” 
Warontherocks (website, 3 October 2016).
17 Ibid.
18 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli 
(Boston: Osgood, 1882). The original quote can be found in the first sentence of chapter XLIII 
(43), “Natives of the Same Country Preserve for all Time the same Characteristics,” found in 
the Third Book of his 1513 work Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius.
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hand in a possible military conflict with NATO.19 The United States, 
afraid of losing its technological advantage over Russia, sought to counter 
this technological revolution and started its own revolution in military 
affairs, which ironically caused the capabilities gap to grow even larger. 
In the following years, this RMA, which is often called the second offset 
strategy, enabled the emergence of an array of new military concepts and 
doctrines, such as network centric warfare, and information warfare. At 
the same time, it created or contributed to technological innovations such 
as stealth technology, the global satellite positing system (GPS), and most 
famously ARPANET, which we now know better as the internet.20
This second offset strategy also created the initial framework for the 
research and development into digital and robotic military technologies, 
which eventually developed into the DRRMA.21 Much of the initial rise 
of robotics remained hidden to the larger public, and it was not until the 
first Gulf War that we saw the first glimpses of how exactly a future of 
robotic conflict would look: It was during this conflict that we saw the 
operational introduction of the most visible part and well known element 
of the DRRMA, namely the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).22 Encour-
19 Götz Neuneck and Christian Alwardt, “The Revolution in Military Affairs, its Driving 
Forces, Elements and Complexity,” IFSH Working paper no. 13 (May 2008).
20 Steven Metz and James Kievit, Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From theory to 
policy (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1995); Singer, Wired for War; Andrew 
Turner, “The Impact of RMA on Peacekeeping” (Paper presented at the Third Annual Gradu-
ate Student Symposium of the Conference of Defense Associations Institute, 3–4 November 
2000). The first offset strategy centered around atomic weapons. For further information on the 
1st, 2nd and current offset strategies see: http://warontherocks.com/beyond-offset/ (accessed 1 
April 2016).
21 Metz and Kievit, Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs. Initially the two elements 
of the DRRMA developed separately, but in recent decades the crossover and interdependence 
between both RMAs have been significant, with both enforcing each other. As the digital 
sophistication of robotic systems further increases and with robotics moving into digital con-
flict we can expect that the interrelation between both RMAs will further grow. See for further 
information on the interaction between both technologies, Robert O. Work and Shawn Brim-
ley, “20YY Preparing for War in the Robotic Age” (Report, Center for New American Security, 
January 2014), 23.
22 These UAVs even managed to capture (limited) headlines when for the first time in conflict 
history soldiers surrendered to an unmanned system: On two occasions, Iraqi soldiers sur-
rendered to RQ-2 Pioneers UAV flying above them. See for further details: “Iraqi soldiers sur-
render to AAI’s drones,” The Baltimore Sun, 2 March 1991.
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aged by its initial success, the United States armed forces conducted fur-
ther research and development into a new generation of robotic systems. 
This resulted in the development of the now iconic MQ-1 Predator, which 
was actively used in the Balkan conflicts.23 Despite its initial success, the 
DRRMA progressed relatively slowly, and it was not until the outbreak 
of what later became known as the Global War on Terror (GWOT) that 
the development of DRRMA fully took off, and further signs and visions 
of an emerging robotic notion of conflict arose. It was during the initial 
two years of the GWOT that the world was introduced to armed UAVs 
(UCAVs) – or killer drones as they more popularly became known – and 
a further wide variety of unmanned systems, operating on land, sailing 
the seas, operating in space, and foremost flying in the air. During this 
decade, the development, procurement and use of unmanned systems 
became widespread: The United States armed forces alone increased their 
UAV and UCAV capacity forty-fold. European, South-Korean, and Jap-
anese armed forces acquired their first unmanned systems, and China 
and Russia developed their own unmanned systems. A study by the New 
America Foundation found that in 2015 seventy-eight nations and non-
state actors had unmanned capabilities, and that twenty two actors pos-
sessed armed unmanned capabilities.24
As such, the first notion of future robotic conflict has already started, 
and that in this regard the future is now, or even already behind us. As 
the numbers illustrate – military robotics, and the DRRMA – became a 
global military affair, with increasingly military nations seeking to shift 
the burden of conducting military conflict to non-human robotic systems, 
rather than solely humans. Nevertheless, it should be noted that conflicts 
in which robotic systems are actively involved remain to date limited. As 
noted earlier, the group of drone-striking-nations has increased rapidly in 
recent years, but still remains limited, particularly when compared with 
other conflicts around the globe, in which conventional weapon systems 
and human soldiers are without any doubt still the most important force. 
23 Houston R. Cantwell, RADM Thomas J. Cassidy’s MQ-1 Predator: The USAF's first UAV suc-
cess story (BiblioScholar, 2012).
24 New American Foundation (2015), World of Drones website, available at http://drones.
newamerica.org/ (15 March 2016).
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In this respect, the era of the famed or feared, infamous – depending on 
whom you ask – Kalashnikov is certainly not over. To date much of the 
military robotic integration remains primarily an affair of conventional 
military actors. As the number of conventional conflicts, in which such 
systems could and would be used, is declining, the era and the notion 
of all-out robotic warfare being the standard notion and conduct of war 
remains farfetched and, to quote T.X. Hammers once more, would be “a 
hallucination”.
Toward an increasing non-human  
and robotic notion of conflict?
Even though robotic conflict will not be the most dominant modus of 
warfare in the coming decades, it is without doubt that the frequency 
of robotic warfare will only increase further. Therefore, the question 
of whether such conflicts could take place, and what they would look 
like, seems just and necessary. As noted above, (recent) history might be 
able to show some initial insights into future robotic conflict. The CIA 
drone wars, and the subsequent drone strikes by other nations illus-
trate a conduct of war in which the soldier is not actively in the com-
bat zone, but remains nevertheless heavily engaged in the conflict itself. 
Thus being to the extent that UAV operators suffer from higher psycho-
logical burdens of conflicts, such as PTSD, than their colleagues actu-
ally physically present in (human) combat zones.25 In addition, current 
military robotic systems generally require a high degree of supervision 
and support. An estimated 120 personnel are needed to operate a single 
US MC-9 Reaper UAV and its operations. As such, despite all the talk 
about unmanned wars, current robotic conflict with unmanned systems 
remains still very much, and quite paradoxically, a human intensive, and 
even costly, affair.
25 Wayne Chappelle et al., “An Analysis of Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms in United States 
Air Force Drone Operators,” Journal of Anxiety Disorders 28:5 (2013): 480–487; Alex Edney-
Browne, “Embodiment and Affect in a Digital Age: Understanding mental illness in military 
drone operations,” Krisis 1 (2017): 19–33.
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The question however arises to which extent this initial notion of 
robotic conflict is likely to resemble the future of robotic conflict? In this 
regard, the initial notion of robotic conflict was and is one of a rather 
“simple” robotic conflict. Indeed, much of what we currently have seen of 
robotic warfare has taken place in asymmetrical scenarios, in which those 
at the receiving end of robotic strikes have had limited, or no means, 
to defend themselves against unmanned systems, meaning that nations 
using unmanned systems could and can use relatively unsophisticated 
systems, who have only limited (robotic) capabilities. A brief look at the 
systems currently in use – from the American Predators and Reapers 
to the Chinese Ch-4s – illustrate that the large majority of unmanned 
systems in use have by no means the capability to survive in a hostile 
environment, and as such do not pose a threat to actors with significant 
military capabilities. For example, the American Predator UAV that tried 
to take on an Iraqi MiG-25 – an aircraft which has been around for over 
40 years. In the words of David Axe it “sucked at it”: It failed to hit the 
opposing aircraft and was quickly turned into a heap of burning metal 
and plastic, spiralling towards the desert.26
We should view the recent history of robotic conflict as a starting 
point in the larger technological revolution of the DRRMA. Much like the 
T-Ford, it was a technological highlight during its times, yet at the same 
time it was the start of a long development cycle, spanning over a century 
already, with significant changes along the way. This is bound to happen 
as well with the development of military robotic systems, and as such 
we can likewise expect major changes to the configuration and capabili-
ties of unmanned systems. In order to understand in which direction the 
DRRMA will evolve, and what those major changes would be, we should 
first understand how military actors perceive the “general” future of mili-
tary affairs. In this regard, and despite the GWOT and all other affiliated 
abbreviated anti-terrorism wars, the common understanding is still that 
nation states, who have military capabilities well beyond any insurgent 
and terrorist army, see other nation states as the primary military and 
26 David Axe, “Predator drones once shot back at jets… but sucked at it,” blog post at Wired 
(11 September 2012).
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security threat. Indeed, in East-Europe, Al-Qaeda, or ISIS, or any other 
terrorist organization is not seen as the primary threat, rather it is one 
that has been for long perceived as the foremost threat: Russia.27
In China, the Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army 
do not view Islamic terrorism as their primary threat, it is the United 
States, its Asian Pivot and its regional allies (e.g. Japan and India) that 
are on top of their threat list. At the same time, the other regional actors 
in South-East and East-Asia view China as their primary threat, even if 
in some active terrorist insurgencies do take place.28 Even the initiator 
of the GWOT, and the nation spending most military resources in the 
fight against global Islamic terrorism, the United States, does not view 
global terrorism as the most existential and primary threat. In a state-
ment last year, the now chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Marine Corps 
General Joseph Dunford, stated he sees Russia as the primary threat, fol-
lowed by China and North-Korea respectively, with ISIS only in fourth 
place.29 Despite all the recent focus on “new wars”, hybrid wars or any 
other euphuism, classical conventional, symmetrical threats and con-
flicts are still dominating future threat and conflict scenarios. It therefore 
comes as no surprise that the directional development of robotic military 
systems has over the course of the last years steered towards systems that 
are aimed at such future threat scenarios.
The design of the current generation of unmanned systems under 
development seems to depart from the initial “simplicity” and puts an 
increasingly large emphasis on automation and autonomous capabilities, 
which should allow for survivability in the highest spectrum of military 
violence. Examples such as the X47B, an UAV capable of starting and 
landing on an aircraft carrier, the RQ-170, 180 UAVs, and the Chinese 
“Divine Eagle” are prime examples of next-generation automated and 
autonomous unmanned, stealth systems, which are capable of conducting 
the majority of their tasks without any human interference or guidance, 
27 Margriet Drent et al., New Threats, New EU and NATO Responses (The Hague: Clingendael 
Institute, 2015).
28 Burgers, “An Unmanned South-China-Sea?” – The China Threat: Perceptions, myths and 
reality, ed. Ian Storey and Herbert Yee (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).
29 For a summary and a report of Dunford’s statement see The Wall Street Journal, 9 July 2015.
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and which should be capable of operating in the highest violence spec-
trum. This drive for automation and autonomous capabilities, and surviv-
ability is likewise witnessed in the development of the new generations 
of UGVs and UUVs. The US Navy self-guided unmanned patrol boats 
are a prime example. These boats are entirely operating autonomously, 
including the capability to communicate with each other and operate 
in swarm tactics.30
Likewise, in the field of Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) devel-
opment the direction is heading towards more robotic capabilities, and 
lesser human involvement. The U.S. Navy, in their Unmanned Under-
sea Vehicle Master Plan, indicate too that it seeks to build systems that 
can operate for long periods of time, with very limited human involve-
ment.31 The anti-submarine warfare continuous trail unmanned vessel, 
30 Dan Gettinger, “What You Need to Know About Drone Swarms” (Blog post, Center for the 
Study of the Drone at Bard College, November 2014).
31 James Holmes, “The U.S. Navy’s Next Super Weapon? Here Come Unmanned Underwater 
Vehicles,” National Interest (January 2015); United States Navy, The Navy Unmanned Undersea 
Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan (published online, 2004).
An X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System demonstrator flies near the aircraft 
carrier USS George H.W. Bush.  Official U.S. Navy photo by Erik Hildebrandt
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or ACTUV, is the prime example of this vision of next generation UUVs, 
capable of operating independently for months at a time, covering thou-
sands of sea miles.32 The desire for more robotics and less humans is not 
solely an American one: Samsung developed an almost entirely auton-
omous stationary robot, the SGR-A1, which is able to autonomously 
identify and destroy targets.33 Likewise, in Europe (e.g. Taranis and the 
nEUROn) and China (Dark Sword and Sharp Sword) further unmanned 
systems are under development which focus on medium to high combat 
zones, and which are largely autonomous and automated.34 In this, the 
current generation of unmanned systems under development seems to be 
pushing the boundaries of human involvement and control in unmanned 
systems: The role of a human operator will become increasingly limited 
and will primarily focus on target selection and the decision to engage 
a target, leaving all other roles and tasks to robotic systems itself. This 
human decision to engage a target would then become the sole boundary 
left before we can truly speak of robotic conflict. Indeed, in the discussion 
on future robotic conflict, and if this will occur, the human-in-the-loop 
argument has been used as the main argument that full robotic conflict 
will not take place (in the near future).
This discussion, however, when the full boundary of robotic conflict 
is reached is somewhat flawed. The main argument in this discussion has 
been so far that there has always been, and will be a human in the loop. In 
the case of the current (CIA) drone strike campaign such has been indeed 
the case, as the threat environment is minimal, allowing the (human) 
32 For more information, see Cheryl Pellerin, “Deputy Defense Secretary to Help DARPA 
Christen New Class of Sea Vessel,” U.S. Department of Defense (online, April 2016).
33 Alexander Velez-Green, “The South Korean Sentry – A “killer robot” to prevent war,” Law-
fare (blog post, 1 March 2015). The SGR-A1 in its current operational use is still controlled 
by humans. Samsung itself argues that there is still very much a human in the loop. However, 
the system has the capability to go fully autonomous, and even in its current configuration the 
only decision made by a human operator is the decision to engage a target. As such, rather than 
speaking of a human in the loop, it would be better to rename a human on the loop, given the 
limited interaction and involvement of humans in the entire process.
34 David Axe, “China’s First Stealthy Killer Drone Takes Flight,” blog post at Warisboring (Novem-
ber 2013); Michael S. Chase et al., “Emerging Trends in China’s Development of Unmanned 
Systems,” Rand National Defense Research Inst. (Santa Monica, CA., January 2015). For more 
information about the systems, see the websites of Dassault Aviation and UK Defence Journal.
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operator sufficient time – at times even weeks – to decide to strike at a 
target or not.35 However, in a high paced, conventional military conflict 
such is not the case. Here the decision to engage would be one of minutes, 
if not seconds. Seconds in which a decision must be made, based on infor-
mation provided by machines and digital technology. In such a scenario, 
it can be expected that the operator will follow up on the digital input and 
advice. As such we could argue that in such situations the human-in-the-
loop concept is rather limited, or even non-existent. A perfect example of 
this is the Iron Dome system, used by the Israeli Defence Force to defend 
against rocket attacks from the Gaza strip. According to the IDF a human 
operator always has the final decision to engage or not, and it argues that 
as such there is indeed a human in the loop. However, this loop is lim-
ited to 3 seconds, making it debatable if a human is really in the loop. 
Therefore, the author believes that, even when a human is in the loop 
in the near future, we can actually speak of robotic conflict. And given 
the frenzy with which major military nations and arms manufactures are 
researching and developing next generation autonomous and automated, 
high-end systems, it seems increasingly likely that future conflicts will 
occur which will be truly robotic in nature. Thus, it is not a question if, 
but rather when, robotic conflict takes place. When this occurs, it would 
create an entire new paradigm in conflict: It would mark the first time in 
the entire history of mankind that conflict would be fought without any 
direct human involvement.
Political implications: an invisible peace  
or a perpetual state of war?
As this new paradigm of conflict arrives on the horizon, it raises questions 
about the political implications of this new notion of conflict. Throughout 
history, the conduct of violent and military conflict and wars have been 
limited due to its social, economic, political and human cost. Foremost 
35 Jason Wei, “The Case for Drone Warfare,” Dartmouth College Debates in International Poli-
tics (November 2016).
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the human factor has influenced whether conflicts would start, continue, 
and end: Societies have boundaries of just how much destruction and 
death they are willing to bear. Particularly in recent decades, in developed 
nations, the willingness of the larger public to engage in conflict, and 
foremost to sustain casualties, has been very limited. Indeed, numbers 
show that violent conflicts and related casualties over the course of the 
last decades have slowly decreased.36 However, robotic systems have the 
potential to reverse this course, which could possibly lead to an increase 
in conflict again: The use of unmanned machines, the absence of human 
casualties, and the low visibility of such conflicts, could create a scenario 
in which political leaders would seek the appliance of violence once more 
to pursue political goals and to solve political conflicts, rather than first 
trying to solve a political conflict via diplomatic means. This would con-
stitute a major change and reversion of the progress made over the course 
of the last decades. It would be a reversion of the Kantian goal of a per-
petual state of peace. Rather, it could be replaced by a perpetual state of 
conflict: An invisible, ever continuing state of violence fought by robotic 
machines. We therefore should seek to better understand the implica-
tions of the rising use of robotic systems in military affairs before we enter 
a world in which the violent appliance of robotic systems becomes the 
norm to solve (political) conflicts, and in which perpetual peace remains 
an invisible dream. As the US colonel stated earlier on in the paper: “We 
are building a bridge to the future, while standing on it”.37 Well, it seems 
time we should start to consider better in which direction this bridge is 
going, and how future conflict will look once we cross over the bridge.
36 Human Security Centre. Human Security Report 2005: War and peace in the 21st century 
(Oxford University Press, 2005).
37  Singer, Wired for War, 16.
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